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Background Definitions:
● The Epistemological Given:
○ Known independent of any other kind of knowledge (ususally a kind of sense 
experience)
○ Epistemically efficacious, provides foundation for knowledge.
● Experience: passive and active faculties working at the same time. 
● Concepts: items of a public language. 
The Problem
● What is the role of language in experience and knowledge?
● Defining Knowledge:
● Sellars (1997): Introduces the “Myth of the Given”
○ Allowing the Given to have these two roles is problematic
○ Knowledge is justifying and being able to justify what one says
○ It follows from this that all knowledge is linguistic and/or conceptual
○ Something like a Given remains as a kind of data, related to the senses, which our beliefs can be 
about.
● What about experience?
○ Experience has a passive, nonconceptual level Given over by the senses.
● Answer: On the one hand, knowledge is purely linguistic, but, on the other hand, while experience 
has a linguistic level; it has a nonlinguistic, passive, sensory level as well. 
● The Takeaway: If knowledge has to be linguistic, what is the role of experience in the acquisition 
of knowledge?
What is the Role of Nonlinguistic Experience in Knowledge 
● If there is conceptual and nonconceptual levels to experience, it implies that there is 
two kinds of content in experience, one conceptual and one nonconceptual. 
● Bonjour (1999): There is a nonconceptual content (the Given) which is described by 
concepts in instances of perceptual knowledge. 
○ For Bonjour if we are (1) if a belief I have describes nonconceptual content and 
(2) I understand what that belief is describing, i.e. I understand what an 
experience is like to have such a conceptual description, then I am in good 
position to be justified in that belief.
● The role of experience is as a limited justifier. 
● However, still two kinds of content, one linguistic, which makes up knowledge, and the 
other perceptual, and related to the senses. This resembles an idea from Merleau-
Ponty, that there is a Chaismbetween the sensible and the intelligible, i.e. there is a gap 
between the senses and knowledge.
The Phenomenological & Semantic Contents of Experienc
● Crane (2013):
○ Phenomenological Contents: 
■ “spaciotemporal, concrete, particular, and specific to the subject”
■ The Given
■ Not knowledge: but can provide limited justification. 
○ Semantic Contents:
■ Abstracted from phenomenological content
■ Forms beliefs
■ Conceptual/Linguistic
■ Knowledge: can be about phenomenological content.
The Seen and the Known: The ChiasmBetween the Sensible and 
Intelligable
● For Merleau-Ponty there is an chiasmbetween the sensible and the intelligible. 
(Toadvine, 2016).
○ I want to clarify this idea:
○ I suggest that this implies there is a distinction between the kind of content which 
we “see” in experience, and the kind of content which structures our knowledge.
● The Seen (the Phenomenological content):
○ Given over by the senses.
○ Nonconceptual in nature.
○ Only limited justificatory power.




● The Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-Ponty, 1968):
○ “if speech, which is but a region of the intelligible world, can also be its refuge, this is 
because speech prolongs into the invisible, extends unto the semantic operations, the 
belongingness of the body to being and the corporeal relevance of every being, which 
for me is once and for all attested by the visible, and whose idea each intellectual 
evidence takes a little further”
● Here, the Visible is what is Given over by the senses; while the Invisible is made 
up of language which makes the world “intelligable”.
● We never really see what we know
● Seeing is never believing
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